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On 8 April 2010 the World Bank approved a US$3.75 billion loan to 
help South Africa achieve a reliable source of electricity supply. The 
loan, the World Bank’s largest lending engagement with South Africa 
since the end of apartheid, was provided to South Africa’s state-owned 
power utility, Eskom, and was brought about by the circumstances 
surrounding South Africa’s energy crisis of 2007–8, and the global 
financial crisis that exposed South Africa’s vulnerability to an energy 
shock and accompanying severe economic consequences. Named 
the Eskom Investment Support Project (the Eskom Project), the 
World Bank loan will co-finance the completion of the 4800MW 
Medupi coal-fired power station (US$3.05 billion), the piloting for 
a utility-scale 100MW wind-power project in Sere and a 100MW 
concentrated solar-power project with storage in Upington (US$260 
million), and low-energy efficient components, including a railway 
to transport coal with fewer greenhouse gas emissions.1
According to Ruth Kagia, the World Bank country director for 
South Africa, the Eskom project offers the World Bank an opportunity 
to ‘strengthen its partnership with the government of South Africa’. 
This, according to Vijay Iyer, the World Bank energy sector manager 
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for Africa, is the ‘biggest grid-connected renewable energy venture 
in any developing country’.2 The project received strong political 
support from South Africa. President Jacob Zuma, in a motivating 
letter to Robert Zoellick, the World Bank president, described South 
Africa’s energy sector, and Eskom’s role in it, as of ‘strategic national 
importance’ urging Zoellick ‘to do all [he could] to expedite support 
to … Eskom’.3
The Eskom project, however, did not receive strong support from 
all sectors of the South African polity. While the representatives of the 
governments of the US, the UK and the Netherlands on the World 
Bank board abstained from voting in favour, citing concerns around 
the country’s lack of progress on developing renewable alternatives, 
the most significant reservation came from the ranks of political 
opposition in South Africa, and in particular, the official opposition. 
The leader of the official opposition, Western Cape provincial 
premier Helen Zille, went to the extent of lobbying the governments 
of the US and UK not to support Eskom’s request for a World Bank 
loan. The rationale for the opposition was that the Eskom project 
would ‘enrich the [governing] ANC by a clear profit of an estimated 
R1 billion without any tax’. This, according to Zille, is the ‘result 
of a corrupt deal in terms of which the ANC in the state [through 
Eskom] has given a contract corruptly to the ANC in business, to 
Chancellor House, to enrich the ANC as a political party’. This, the 
Democratic Alliance further argued, ‘is a massive conflict of interest’ 
as a result of which the ruling political party would make a clear 
profit of R1 billion through a commercial transaction with a public 
enterprise.4
Given the high-level involvement and extent of political support 
for the Eskom project, Zille’s allegations are very serious. In particular, 
they point to some of the major problems, but also necessities, facing 
advanced and emerging democracies – the financing of political life, 
the relationship between ruling parties and public enterprises, and 
the opportunities this all creates for political corruption. What is 
‘political finance’ and ‘political corruption’? How is it both a necessity 
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and problem in the politics of democracy? What significance, if any, 
does it have for the Eskom project, particularly with regard to the 
ANC investment arm Chancellor House? This essay will deal with 
the politics of party finance with respect to the role of Chancellor 
House in the ANC in particular, and with respect to debates on the 
need for its regulation in general. 
Party finance defined
All political parties face common problems of how to find sufficient 
financial resources to fund their general activities. Competition 
between political parties and the pressures of maintaining governing 
political parties in power drive up the costs of political campaigning 
and intensify the search for additional and new income streams. In 
this environment, money is the key variable; ‘money buys the access, 
favours, skills, goods and services that are essential to effective party 
activity’.5 Money is instrumental, and its importance, Alexander 
writes, ‘lies in the ways it is used by people to try gain influence, to 
convert into other resources, or to use in combination with other 
resources to achieve political power’.6 Money is thus a ‘transferable 
and convertible resource which helps mobilise support for, and secures 
influence with, political parties’.7 Political finance thus generally refers 
to money that is used for electioneering, the costs of maintaining 
party offices and employing permanent staff, carrying out policy 
research, and engaging in political education, voter registration and 
other regular functions of political parties.8 Beyond campaigns and 
parties, money is also spent on other direct political purposes such 
as political foundations, political lobbying, media-related work, 
and litigation in politically relevant cases.9 Therefore, the numerous 
channels through which money is poured into politics can lead to 
serious problems of definition, which consequently makes political 
finance a difficult matter for regulation and control. 
Beyme identifies three main forms of party finance: intra-
party finance, external finance and public finance.10 Intra-party 
sources of finance refer to membership fees which finance political 
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party activities. Other sources of internal finance include income 
from investments, additional contributions from members and 
supporters through party rallies, and the sale of party newspapers and 
publications.11 However, when political parties develop trading and 
investment arms, which inescapably bring them into direct contact 
with the commercial and private sector, lines between internal and 
external sources of finance may blur. This is further complicated when 
governing parties (especially dominant parties) establish commercial 
enterprises that engage in business transactions with the government 
sector, eventuating in conflicts of interest and political corruption. 
External sources of funding refer to money received from private 
organisations and individuals. Usually, this takes the form of financial 
support given by organised constituencies within parties, such as 
money given by trade unions to progressive social democratic or 
labour parties. External funding can also be derived from the close 
relations that develop between ruling political parties and large 
corporate enterprises. This particular source of funding tends to 
attract the most adverse comment as it raises questions of who is 
beholden to whom and for what, and the extent to which parties 
are accountable to voters and their core constituencies. Thus the 
motives of private contributors to political parties are often called 
into question, with suspicions particularly aroused when there are 
attempts to conceal or disguise donations. As Williams puts it, 
‘what the Americans call influence peddling, what the French call 
pantouflage and what ordinary citizens everywhere call corruption 
tends to undermine public trust in parties and encourages cynicism 
about politicians, their motives and their loyalties’.12 
Public funding is presented as a way of freeing political parties 
from the obligations created by their dependence on income from 
business groups.13 The risk, however, is that parties may simply 
exchange one form of dependency from another – ‘as parties and 
their office-holders become more dependent on the state, they are less 
beholden to their voters, supporters and members, and this may erode 
ties of loyalty and weaken accountability’.14 Public funding can thus 
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serve to simply strengthen the orientation of parties towards the state 
and, at the same time, contribute to their shifting away from society 
at large.15 In addition to reinforcing the linkages between parties and 
the state, public funding may also serve to encourage a particular 
conception of democracy and political parties, by which parties are 
‘increasingly seen as an essential public good for democracy and 
less exclusively as the private voluntary associations which are the 
instruments of civil society’.16
Party finance, political corruption and conflict of interest
From Beyme’s categorisation, it is thus possible to see where the 
opportunities and incentives for political corruption arise. While 
corruption is a contested concept, most approaches to the subject rest 
on the distinction between a formal obligation to pursue the public 
good and conduct which is construed as private and which serves 
to undermine the public good.17 Significantly, it focuses attention 
on the extent to which parties are seen as public rather than private 
organisations, giving the term both a legal dimension and a matter of 
popular and media perception. The emphasis is on political corruption, 
as opposed to corruption generally, and attention is devoted to the 
public sphere in which political actors operate, i.e. the ‘interface 
between the public and private spheres – such as when politicians 
or functionaries use their privileged access to [state] resources (in 
whatever form) illegitimately to benefit themselves, [political parties] 
or others’.18 Boundaries are therefore very important: political 
corruption does not include those activities which take place wholly 
outside the public sphere, such as private sector business or financial 
corruption.
Alatas has developed a broad-ranging typology of political 
corruption on the basis of a minimalist definition: ‘corruption is the 
abuse of trust in the interest of private gain.’19 He identifies five forms 
or types of corruption: defensive, investive, nepotistic, autogenic 
and supportive. In so doing, he draws distinctions between high 
and low level (i.e. grand versus petty), local and national, personal 
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and institutional (i.e. personal enrichment and political party), 
and traditional and modern forms of corruption (i.e. nepotism and 
patronage versus money laundering and creative accounting).20
Political corruption essentially involves a conflict between the 
personal interests of a decision-maker in the private and public sector 
and those of the entity that he or she serves. This ‘conflict of interests’ 
involves a clash between the public duties of the decision-maker 
concerned and his/her personal interests, and occurs when the public 
office-holder ‘puts his/her personal or financial interests ahead of the 
public interest’. In the simplest terms, ‘the official reaps a monetary 
or other reward from a decision made in his or her public capacity’.21 
That these interests may at times not result in the public official 
improperly executing his/her public duties is inconsequential – even 
the appearance of impropriety undermines the public’s faith in the 
political process as fair and erodes public confidence in a free society 
and democratic government. Conflicts of interest thus create the 
perception that public officials do not make decisions in the public 
interest, and that the financial pressures associated with the politics 
of political parties are more important in deciding positions on issues 
of public policy than the achievement of the common good. These 
issues – party political finance, and the conditions and opportunities 
it creates for political corruption and conflicts of interests, real or 
perceived – are at the heart of the Eskom project, especially with regard 
to the involvement of Chancellor House Holdings, the investment 
arm of the ANC, in particular, and the conduct of business between 
the ANC and the government in general.
The ANC Inc.: Chancellor House and Eskom
The ANC launched its first investment arm in 1992. As part of 
the transition to democracy, and in preparation for registering and 
functioning as a political party, the ANC set up the Batho Batho Trust 
with Nelson Mandela, Walter Sisulu and Tokyo Sexwale as trustees. 
The trust established Thebe Investments. Thebe took over the ANC’s 
financially troubled Movement Marketing Enterprises, which then 
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had the franchise to sell Nelson Mandela T-shirts and other ANC 
memorabilia, and soon became the ANC’s investment arm. Thebe 
acquired Dakawa Properties, which owned 51 Plein Street, where the 
ANC headquarters of Luthuli House is located, and Oriole Travel, 
then the ANC in-house travel agent.22 Over time Thebe acquired 
significant shareholding in the private health, financial and insurance 
sectors. However, the relationship between the Batho Batho Trust/
Thebe and the ANC gradually became distant – in the late 1990s, 
Batho Batho significantly diluted its stake in Thebe. In 2006 Batho 
Batho rejected the suggestion of Mendi Msimang, ANC treasurer-
general, that the proceeds of its sales be used to pay off ANC debts of 
around R100 million, and insisted rather that ‘the ANC’s request for 
funding would be adjudicated like that of any other applicant’.23 Set 
up by the ANC, in the interests of the ANC, Batho Batho no longer 
answered its master’s call.
It is in this context of party financial insecurity that the 
emergence of Chancellor House Holdings should be understood. 
Chancellor House Holdings was formed in March 2003 through the 
initiative of Mendi Msimang, a very close confidant and associate 
of Thabo Mbeki, who was instrumental in its conceptualisation. In 
his treasurer-general’s report to the ANC’s Polokwane Conference, 
Msimang pointed out that Chancellor House was set up to make the 
ANC self-sufficient at a time when the ANC was going through a 
turbulent financial period ‘and needed an investment mechanism to 
ensure funding on a sustainable basis’.24 In his report to the ANC’s 
National Financial Committee, Msimang said that Chancellor House 
‘had given the ANC a sound portfolio of investments’ and that ‘a 
deficit of R76 million had been transformed into a surplus of R67 
million at the end of 2007’.25 As it turns out, Chancellor House 
Holdings is a true success story and has enabled the ANC to achieve a 
sound financial position. The Chancellor House investment portfolio 
is reported to have a market value in excess of R1.75 billion, making 
the ANC one of the wealthiest political parties in the world.26 Funds 
from Chancellor House cover the monthly expenses and salaries 
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of officials and other related costs.27 Unlike other BEE ventures 
linked to senior ANC members, Chancellor House is not a personal 
enrichment exercise but rather a commercial enterprise explicitly set 
up to fund the ANC as a political party. 
Chancellor House has focused strongly on the minerals and 
energy sector in which the 2004 Mineral and Petroleum Resources 
Development Act and its associated empowerment charter created 
lucrative BEE opportunities. The Chancellor House Trust is the sole 
shareholder of Chancellor House Holdings, whose subsidiaries include 
Chancellor House Mineral Resources Investments, Chancellor 
House Energy Resources and Chancellor House Marine Investments. 
The Chancellor House Trust deed specifies no beneficiaries, but the 
trustees are Popo Molefe, CEO of Lereko Investments and chairperson 
of the Chancellor House Trust, and Salukazi Dakile-Hlongwane, an 
executive director of Nozala Investments. Molefe also serves as the 
chairperson of the state-owned Petroleum Oil and Gas Corporation 
of South Africa (PetroSA), and the Armaments Corporation of South 
Africa (Armscor). The chairperson of Chancellor House Holdings is 
Professor Taole Mokoena, a distinguished surgeon and Pretoria-based 
medical academic, and the managing director is Mamatho Netsianda, 
the former deputy defence secretary. Ultimately, Mendi Msimang is 
the boss of Chancellor House, and through him the Mbeki faction in 
the ANC is in firm control over its vast financial resources. 
Chancellor House’s major investments are thus in energy, mining, 
engineering, IT and logistics.28 Its biggest mining investments are 
in the strategic manganese reserves in the Kalahari through United 
Manganese Kalahari (UMK), a joint venture between Chancellor 
House, Pitsa Ya Setshaba Holdings and Renova Manganese 
Investments (RMI), a Bahamas-registered subsidiary of the Renova 
Group controlled by Russian oligarch Viktor Vekselberg.29 UMK 
was awarded ‘new order’ prospecting rights by the Department of 
Minerals and Energy (DME) to eight farm portions in the Kuruman 
district of the Kalahari, totalling some 15,200 hectares. RMI 
controlled 49 per cent of UMK, with Chancellor House and Pitsa 
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both controlling 51 per cent. UMK was funded by Renova to the 
amount of US$20 million, ‘effectively gifting nearly half this sum to 
Chancellor and Pitsa as RMI partners’.30 However, with the Kalahari 
being home to 80 per cent of the world’s known commercially 
exploitable manganese resources, and South Africa accounting for 
just under a fifth of world production, the UMK project itself could 
reach a value well in excess of R1 billion.31 
The granting of prospecting rights to UMK has aroused suspicion, 
especially in view of the complaints of two other ANC-related BEE 
companies, Kalahari Resources and Dirleton Minerals and Energy, 
who lost out on the deal.32 These suspicions were increased by 
investigative journalist reports on shareholder composition revealing 
the close proximity of Kalahari Resources to Kgalema Motlanthe 
and of Dirleton to Zwelakhe Sisulu.33 They were further clouded 
by reports that Motlanthe is alleged to have presided over a meeting 
aiming to influence Renova to include Kalahari but not Chancellor 
House in the UMK consortium.34 Given that Mbeki’s faction has 
controlled Chancellor House, Motlanthe’s lobbying against its 
inclusion in the deal indicates  that the ANC’s multiple investment 
arms, controlled by competing factions, have become weapons in 
intra-party factional wars. This view is strengthened by the political 
fall-out from the Eskom project.
Chancellor House’s recent and most controversial investments are 
in the energy sector. Chancellor House is a 25 per cent shareholder 
in Hitachi Power Africa, the local subsidiary of Babcock-Hitachi 
Europe. Hitachi Power Africa ‘was formed in 2005 in response to 
Eskom’s programme to install new generation capacity’ which was 
heavily reliant on the construction of coal-fired power stations.35 
Controversy arose out of Hitachi’s interest in the Eskom project. In 
March 2006 Eskom had invited tenders for a project under a new 
electricity plan that involved a contract to construct the Medupi coal-
fired power station near Lephalale in Limpopo. Tenders for the boiler 
works were received from Alstom S&E and Steinmüller Africa in 
consortium (the Alstom Steinmüller Consortium) and from Hitachi 
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Power Africa and Hitachi Power Europe in consortium (the Hitachi 
Consortium).36 In terms of the evaluations, the Alstom Steinmüller 
Consortium’s tenders ranked first overall. In August 2007 Eskom 
accepted the Alstom Steinmüller Consortium tender but subject to 
certain conditions, i.e. technical and commercial issues that had a 
bearing on the scope of the works and would have had an impact on 
the price that was tendered. These conditions became a thorny issue 
between Eskom and the consortium, to the extent that the consortium 
rejected Eskom’s proposed mechanisms to deal with the outstanding 
issues. As the matter could not be resolved, Eskom decided to approach 
the other tenderer, the Hitachi Consortium, which subsequently 
resubmitted its tender ‘to a comparative evaluation against that of 
the Alstom Steinmüller Consortium’ and emerged as the preferred 
tender.37 After approval by Eskom’s board of directors, the contract 
was concluded at the end of October 2007. 
The procurement process was reviewed by Deloitte & Touche. 
Inquiries were made to identify any conflict of interests of board 
members that had tendered for the Medupi boiler contract. These 
inquiries ‘consisted only of public record corporate entity searches 
relating to South African registered entities’.38 Deloitte identified the 
involvement of a ‘political entity’ and stated: ‘In the course of the 
assignment, we learnt that Chancellor House, a company allegedly 
owned by the African National Congress (ANC), is a shareholder 
in Hitachi Power Africa.’ Deloitte stressed that it could not make a 
call on whether or not this had had a bearing on the tender process: 
‘Although it may be inferred that the ruling party may be both player 
and referee in such a situation, no information was brought to our attention 
that any political influence was exerted in relation to the Project 
Alpha (the Medupi) tender process.’39
Further, as far as the procurement process prior to the decision 
of the board is concerned, Deloitte ‘did not identify any material 
irregularities or deviation from the applicable policies or legislation’.40 
The significance that this procurement process and resultant contract 
have for the issue of political party finance, and its opportunities for 
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political corruption and conflict of interest, turns on the involvement 
of Eskom’s then chairperson of the board, Valli Moosa. Moosa is 
the chairperson of Lereko Investments, whose CEO, Molefe, is 
chairperson of the Chancellor House Trust. Significantly, Moosa is 
not only a senior member of the ANC through his membership of its 
National Executive Committee (NEC), and chairperson of one of its 
strategic sub-committees (Committee on Realignment of Opposition 
Forces), but is also a key member of the party’s National Finance 
Committee. According to the ANC’s constitution, the committee has 
to report at least twice a year on the finances and budget of the ANC.
Moosa’s chairmanship of the Eskom board, and subsequent 
involvement in the awarding of the Medupi boiler contract to the 
Hitachi Consortium (Chancellor House Holdings has a 25 per cent 
stake in Hitachi Power Africa), were the subject of an investigation 
by the Public Protector. The Public Protector’s investigation found 
that there was a conflict between Moosa’s personal interests in the 
ANC and his duty towards Eskom. The Public Protector’s report 
stated: ‘There can be no doubt that Mr Moosa, as a member of the 
NEC and its Finance Committee, owed a duty to the ANC to act 
in its best financial interests. Likewise, as the Chairperson of the 
Eskom Board of Directors it was expected of him to act in the best 
financial interests of Eskom. These two interests were therefore in 
direct conflict at the time when the awarding of the contract to the 
Hitachi Consortium was considered by the Board.’41
The concept of conflict of interest, however, covers all types of 
interests that could affect or be perceived to affect the objectivity 
of a decision maker.42 Personal interests are ‘defined separately as 
potential, direct or indirect interests in any entity in any capacity and 
include political interests’.43 Therefore, membership of the governing 
institution (NEC) of a political organisation (ANC) is a personal 
interest. This raises a deeper question on the role of the ANC. The 
Public Protector, however, had a limited brief: the Public Protector 
Act does not afford him the powers to investigate the conduct, affairs 
and relationship of private entities, and political parties, like businesses, 
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are private institutions. This is an unfortunate circumstance as the 
conflict of interest, and potential for political corruption, arose from 
the personal (party political interest) of Moosa. Consequently, the 
issue of whether political parties should be allowed to be involved 
in business dealings with public entities is a matter for parliament 
to consider and for legislation to resolve and regulate.  Chancellor 
House’s role and Moosa’s involvement in the Eskom project form an 
instance of political corruption. It involved the use of privileged access 
to Eskom through the chairmanship of the board (of a party member 
of the National Finance Committee) to directly benefit the ANC.
The dust had yet to settle on the issue of Chancellor House’s 
stake in Hitachi, when the political stormclouds gathered. In early 
April 2010, in response to the controversy, ANC treasurer-general 
Mathews Phosa told the Sunday Times that he had advised Chancellor 
House to exit from Hitachi and that Chancellor had agreed to do so 
within six weeks: ‘[the ANC] took a decision to disinvest. Initially, 
there were different views, but we now have agreed to disinvest, and 
Chancellor House has accepted that. But as a shareholder, we can 
only give advice to Chancellor House.’44 Phosa further admitted that 
Chancellor’s investment was a conflict of interest and didn’t mince 
his words about what it implied: ‘We’re definitely not interested in 
getting involved in shady deals and taking advantage of the taxpayer 
to raise money. We want to set a proper example and be accountable.’45 
Phosa was further quoted in Engineering News as saying that Molefe, 
chairman of the Chancellor House Trust, had been briefed about the 
planned sale of shares in Hitachi and that there was consensus around 
the issue. In order to withdraw from Hitachi, Chancellor would have 
to offer its 25 per cent shareholding in Hitachi Power Africa back 
to Hitachi. 
Phosa, however, spoke too soon; all the other relevant parties 
contradicted him. First, Robin Duff, chief financial officer of 
Hitachi Power Africa, said it had not been approached by Chancellor 
House, and he knew nothing about the repurchasing of the shares. 
Second, Professor Mokoena, chairman of Chancellor, and Hermanus 
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Loots, a non-executive board member, confirmed that there were 
no plans to sell the shares, stressing that they could not even foresee 
an urgent board meeting on the issue. Mokoena further emphasised 
that Chancellor was an independent company and ‘nobody tells the 
directors what to do’.46 Third, Molefe shrugged off suggestions from 
Phosa that he was supposed to lead the disinvestment process, saying 
that he was not authorised to speak for the ANC or the company. 
Molefe also stressed that Phosa did not have the authority to speak for 
Chancellor House or the trust and that he should stick to ‘building 
[ANC] branches’.47 Fourth, Gwede Mantashe, secretary-general of 
the ANC, contradicted Phosa, saying that ‘such a decision cannot be 
taken at Luthuli House as the Chancellor House board of directors 
operated independently of the ANC’.48
But Phosa was adamant that Molefe agreed to pull out: ‘He 
[Molefe] said to me: “Six weeks is reasonable.” I’m just telling you 
this because there is a lot of nonsense in the air. I said: “Popo, you 
accept six weeks is reasonable?” He said, “Yes.”’49
Phosa also did not mince his words on those who sought to 
protect Chancellor House: ‘I’m saying to you that Popo is being less 
than frank. He knows what we discussed. He went to AMB Capital 
to work out the options. If what is reported is true [Molefe’s denial 
of any agreement to pull out], then he is lying. Full stop.’ 50 Molefe 
replied by simply stating that he couldn’t care less what Phosa said or 
thought, and that he was at liberty to ‘say whatever he wants to say 
to the press’.51
Thus, days after Phosa promised the ANC would sell its stake in 
Hitachi Power Africa, it became clear that not only was the party 
leadership divided on the issue but Phosa, the only figure publicly 
opposed to continuing Chancellor’s stake in Hitachi, was isolated. 
Phosa’s attack on Chancellor, however, was not new. In the immediate 
aftermath of his election as ANC treasurer-general after the 2007 
Polokwane Conference, he vowed to clean up corruption and party 
funding and said that he would open an investigation into Chancellor 
House. 
001314 Paying for Politics.indb   213 2010/09/23   3:03 PM
P A Y I N G  F O R  P O L I T I C S
214
What is clear from the political dynamics around Chancellor 
House’s involvement in the Eskom project and United Manganese 
Kalahari is that neither Phosa nor his predecessor had oversight of 
private funding of the ANC. Msimang had control over financial 
resources channelled from Chancellor but not from other sources. 
The decentralised private funding regime of the ANC has created 
conditions in which competing factions have built up competing 
funding vehicles for the ANC in an attempt to gain control over 
the organisation, and then over the state. This has led to the gradual 
erosion of the authority of the office of the treasurer-general, 
threatening the independence of the party and the integrity of its 
procedures, and the emergence of a political culture in which power 
and authority are vested within the faction that amasses and controls 
the most financial resources. 
In this context, Chancellor House has emerged as the ‘goose that 
lays the golden egg’; a commercial enterprise that effectively controls 
the ANC. Not only does Chancellor pay out the monthly salaries of 
ANC officials, it also paid off the ANC’s most controversial debts. 
According to Msimang’s report to the National Finance Committee, 
the money made by Chancellor House enabled the party to repay 
R11 million as a result of the fall-out from the Oilgate scandal.52 
Chancellor thus represents the continued dominance of the Mbeki 
faction, and the hostility towards its transactions with the government 
should be understood within that context. Mantashe’s defence of 
Chancellor seems more an attempt to mediate between the competing 
interests of the relevant factions. 
The need for private party finance reform
The Chancellor House issue raises general questions about the need for 
legislation to regulate the conduct of business between government 
entities and the investment arms of political parties, especially ruling 
dominant parties. The premise of the arguments for such legislative 
regulation is that this could serve as a legitimate means for curtailing 
illicit practices and behaviour around the political dynamics of party 
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finance. Putting parties under intense public scrutiny relates to the 
desire to restrict or control the influence of private money and to limit 
its distortion of the democratic political process. The concern here 
is to prevent a situation where ‘certain private interests, rather than 
general public interests, would come to guide the conduct of parties 
and elected officials’.53 Thus, since public funding would relieve parties 
from having to satisfy their financial supporters, or subvert the rules 
in their search for new income streams, it would diminish political 
corruption. The introduction of public legislation on party financing 
would give the state ‘a larger degree of control over the role of money 
in politics and a greater opportunity to legitimately exercise some 
degree of supervision over party financial activity, which should [in 
theory] further reduce the potentially excessive influence of private 
contributors at the expense of the public interest’.54
This can be seen from the recent interest of national and 
international governmental institutions and non-governmental 
organisations in regulating the funding of political parties and illicit 
practices of party finance. Internationally, these include bodies such as 
the European Parliament (which investigated the funding of political 
parties in European Union members states), the Council of Europe, 
the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance 
(IDEA) (which has published a handbook on party and campaign 
finance), and Transparency International (which focuses on party 
finance and corruption).55 In South Africa, the bodies have included 
the Institute for a Democratic South Africa (Idasa) and the Institute 
for Security Studies (ISS), which have argued for the disclosure of all 
substantial private donations that political parties receive. 
What emerges from the recommendations and guidelines of these 
organisations is a strong plea for the state to guarantee the accountability 
of parties and the transparency of party financing through legislation 
and public control. At the centre of this is the issue of whether, or 
to what extent, political parties are seen as public rather than private 
organisations. After all, parties occupy a paradoxical position; they 
are bodies that perform a public function (developing policy for 
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government, selecting and presenting candidates for election, as well 
as providing the personnel for both government and opposition) but 
are regulated by private law to the extent that the ‘legal base on 
which they operate is simply the law of contract developed from the 
rules and practices of the party in question’.56 Political parties are 
thus voluntary associations and as such do not necessarily have a legal 
personality, even though in some circumstances it is possible for them 
to be sued or prosecuted in their own name. This legal status (or lack 
of it) often obscures the reality that even though they are private 
bodies, they perform public functions.57
The proponents of reforms have not, however, considered the full 
implications of their arguments. While the introduction of legislation 
may give the state a larger degree of control and supervision over 
the role of money in politics, it may in turn discourage parties from 
looking for additional sources of income and consequently remove 
a key incentive to establish a more structured relationship with civil 
society.58 This may drive parties towards a dependence on public 
funds and, especially in dominant party systems, could facilitate 
the access to, and thereby encourage, the unauthorised use of state 
resources.59 Consequently, the strong dependence on public finance 
in dominant party systems strengthens the pervasive patterns of 
patronage and corruption, and may serve to entrench parties within 
the state. Significantly, regulation runs the risk of contradicting and 
progressively undermining the organisational autonomy of parties 
and their status as private and voluntary associations, ‘turning parties 
into a unique type of public utility’.60 Consequently, the more the 
activities of parties are regulated by public law, ‘the more this will 
lead to their being defined as public service agencies’; this could 
weaken their internal hierarchical order and undermine the capacity 
of political parties for institutional integration.61
Concluding remarks
The Chancellor House case study and the South African party 
political finance regime in general thus pose a serious dilemma. It 
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is clear that some regulation of the conduct of business between the 
government and political parties is necessary, especially with regard 
to governing parties. However, such regulation should be mindful of 
the private nature of political parties as voluntary associations, which 
are created and regulated by their own constitutions and not by 
legislation. Further, the fact that the actions of political parties attract 
widespread public interest ‘does not make its functions “public” in 
the legal sense.’62 
A possible way out of this dilemma would be to give special 
recognition for political parties in national legislation. Germany’s 
Federal Constitution may provide a way out. Article 21 of the 
Basic Law states: ‘The political parties participate in the forming of 
the political will of the people. They may be freely established. Their 
internal organisation shall conform to democratic principles. They 
shall publicly account for the sources of their funds and for their assets.’63 
While acknowledging the voluntary nature of political parties, this 
does provide a framework for the regulation of their finances. This 
in turn provides a foundation for the establishment of internal party 
reforms to conform to the legislative framework. Centralising party 
finance in accordance with a national legislative framework may 
hinder individual elected representatives and party functionaries 
from engaging in illicit activities. It may also remove the headaches 
of treasurers-general competing with wealthier internal factions 
who threaten to hold the parties in question to ransom. There are, 
however, no easy and simple answers. As Nassmacher declares: 
‘Rule-making covering the role of money in politics needs to be a 
multifaceted search for the optimum, not the transfer of a perfect set 
of rules already applied elsewhere.’64 
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